This paper analyzes environmental expenditures in Indonesia -a significant newly industrializing economy -reported at the plant level comprising all 23 thousand manufacturing establishments with more than 20 employees. Since compliance is barely enforced, pollution abatement expenditures are effectively voluntary in nature. This allows us to test whether foreign owned firms expend more due to a technology that adheres to stricter Western standards or whether the predominant effect is that both foreign and domestic exporting companies are more environmentally conscious due to better technology transfer or green consumerism in the Western countries. If so, this would contradict conventional wisdom that environmental expenditures reduce competitiveness and that increased levels of foreign direct investment or export-orientation in manufacturing will necessarily pre-empt firms from behaving in a "greener" fashion.
Introduction
Industrialization in developing countries has often been associated with increasing levels of environmental degradation.
1 While developing countries often do not lack environmental laws and regulations, they more often lack effective enforcement. Insufficient enforcement can result from a shortage of skilled monitoring personnel, but also from a lack of public participation, information disclosure, and wholesale evasion due to lobbying, cronyism, and corruption. 2 Recently, many have claimed that globalization is a main driving force behind developing countries' environmental problems. Forced to compete in internationally and attract foreign direct investment, many developing countries it is suggested keep environmental standards at deliberately low levels. While openness and FDI foster economic growth (Edwards, S. 1998) they may come at the cost of deteriorated environmental quality.
Does industrialization through foreign direct investment and export led growth even in the absence of effective enforcement necessarily conflict with the environmental abatement efforts on the part of industry? This is still a moot point. Whereas many theoretical papers suggest the "globalization cum environmental degradation" view, some evidence suggests that firm level expenditures on environmental abatement are too small to affect the competitive position of a firm or a country (cf. sect. 2). They argue that it is more economical for multinational enterprises to develop a "one-fits-all" technology that adheres to strict environmental standards of the developed countries -thus there is no role for environmental policy to attract FDI. Reliable estimates of industrial environmental costs -in particular for developing countries -are notoriously hard to come by, the most notable exception being the US. 2 Pollution abatement expenditure levels may actually differ across jurisdictions/countries, sectors, and specific firms according to their characteristics and production processes. The limited availability of more widespread international empirical evidence for developing countries, has led many existing studies had to assume that the sectoral structure of environmental expenditures and thus the relative pollution-intensity of sectoral production is equal internationally in order to assess the pollution intensity of trade flows. 4 Obviously, this assumption need not hold as regulations and technologies might be very different across countries in levels and in structure. Moreover, existing studies mostly refer to sectoral data and do not take into account firm-specific variables. 5 In particular, they cannot distinguish between firms that are exposed to foreign competition and those that are not. Also they cannot control for the influence of foreign ownership and thus for potentially more advanced technology through technology transfer within hierarchies. To directly address these questions, we are able to draw of reported environmental abatement expenditures for individual manufacturing establishments, while controlling for export behavior and ownership, as well as a host of other characteristics. We are able to do this through a unique dataset providing such a combination of information for a population of 22 thousand large and medium scale manufacturing establishments wide variety of plant level and regional characteristics as control variables for 1994 to 1996.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a critical assessment of the theoretical and empirical literature on international competitiveness and environmental protection and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the state of environmental regulation and its enforcement in Indonesia. Section 4 presents the empirical model and the data. Section 5 provides the results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Do Environmental Abatement Costs Reduce International Competitiveness?
The impact of enforced environmental regulation on international competitiveness remains subject to considerable disagreement. While some fear a loss of competitiveness from higher Copeland and Taylor (1994; 1995) show that if different environmental regulations in the developed and the developing world reflect different relative preferences for environmental quality free trade will result in specialization of the South in the production of dirtier products. This leads to a reduction of North's welfare if pollution is transboundary. The literature on strategic environmental policy shows how governments may use environmental standards as instrument to secure domestic firms a competitive edge or to attract foreign investment (e.g., Barrett, S. 1994; Markusen, J., E. Morey, and N. Olewiler 1995; Ulph, A. 1996 ). This strategic interaction may then lead to a welfare-deteriorating erosion of environmental standards ('race to the bottom argument') and a relocation of pollution-intensive industries in countries with low standards ('pollution haven hypothesis').
8
Empirical analyses, however, have largely failed to find any significant effect of environmental policy on trade patterns or the direction of foreign direct investment (inter alia Ferrantino, M. 1997; Levinson, A. 1996; Low, P. 1992; Tobey, J. 1990 (Low, P. 1992) . As more comprehensive data on "true" costs of meeting pollution abatement regulations is only available for a limited number of countries (e.g., the US) is hard to test the impact of environmental abatement costs in any direct fashion.
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Second and closely related to the first hypothesis, international capital flows may not respond to lower environmental regulations because it is not profitable for multinationals to adjust their technology to specific countries' environmental regulations and to save ECC (Levinson, A. 1995; Low, P. and A. Yeats 1992) . Rather they develop a one-fits-all technology that adheres to the strictest, i.e. Western standards. Lower standards in developing countries are thus inconsequential for internationally operating firms, but may matter to domestic firms. If this 'technology effect' is indeed important environmental policy will not serve as a strategic instrument to attract FDI. A race to the bottom is not to be expected.
Third, both domestic and foreign firms exporting to foreign markets may have better access to more modern and cleaner technology, also if they are not part of a multinational enterprise, as they have better knowledge of the technologies used by their international competitors and are 10 For want of international data many existing studies assume that other countries have sectoral ECC structures and levels similar to the US. They use these sectoral ECCs as one explanatory variable for trade and FDI patterns. Taking the theoretical literature seriously that describes environmental policy as a factor that -at least potentially -affects trade and investment patterns, similarity of ECCs seems a very strong assumption.
6 able to adopt them more easily. 11 Using modern and cleaner Western technology may not only be motivated by realized cost-savings but also by demand considerations: firms exporting to developed countries' markets may be concerned that consumers in these markets care for environmentally friendly production processes and therefore firms located in countries with lenient regulations but exporting to Western markets would still engage in production that meets Western standards unlike their counterparts producing for the domestic market (cf Wheeler, D. and P. Martin 1992) . This effect caused by 'green consumerism' is irrespective of ownership; it is demand driven as opposed to the above 'technology effect' which is supply driven.
Environmental Regulation in Indonesia
As many developing countries, Indonesia has established a legal framework to regulate industrial -pollution (e.g., water, air, and other ambient pollution levels). 12 Although these regulations often codify standards that are equivalent or even exceed developed country standards, the actual enforcement of these remains notoriously weak to non-existent. 13 The capacity to actively enforce environmental amelioration on the part of industrial plants is curtailed by lack of capacity, resources, a lack of effective monitoring or sanctioning of plants 11 Many firms in developing countries produce intermediate products for Western firms that supply them with modern technology. In Indonesia, many domestically owned firms in the textile, garment and shoe industries produce for European and American firms which have outsourced the core production process. In the face of pervasive problems to enforcement during the nineties, the Indonesian government focused on essentially voluntary programs to encourage environmental behavior on the part of industry (Afsah, Shakeb, Allen Blackman, and Damayanti Ratunanda 2000) .
Pioneering efforts included the Clean Rivers Program (PROKASIH) (1989ff), which focused on the discharge of industrial pollution in waterways. Under the PROPER extension in the mid-1990s, the government resorted to a mechanism of the voluntary disclosure of a rating system for water pollution compliance. 15 Formal coverage of firms amounted to only about 5 percent of manufacturing establishments in eleven river basins across Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan, and was based on the recognition that formal regulations and sections were proving largely ineffective (Pargal, Sheoli, Hemamala Hettige, Manjula Singh, and David
Wheeler 1998, Section 2.2). In the meantime also this program has been discontinued as it has proven to be also ineffective and plagued by corruption and pervasive bureaucratic inefficiency.
Starting from the recognition that formal environmental control is de facto non-existent in Indonesia, (Pargal, Sheoli and David Wheeler 1996) and (Pargal, Sheoli, Hemamala Hettige, Manjula Singh, and David Wheeler 1998) have argued that public participation/ civic protest partly substitutes for the lack of effective enforcement of regulation: in the absence of 14 Not only are responsibilities undefined across varies sectoral agencies, but environmental protection agencies suffer from a severe lack of skilled staff and from corruption. There is broad consensus that BAPEDAL ultimately lacks the legal basis to monitor and enforce emissions standards and is not allowed to sue polluters ADB. profile of the local population. In a small sample (N=243) for 1989-90 they find that one major water pollutant, i.e. biological oxygen demand, varies significantly with these local community characteristics. They conclude that informal regulation is effective. However, the program included only a small fraction of establishments, only about 1 percent of those establishments in our current manufacturing census. Moreover, our emphasis is on reported spending on environmental abatement as a cost factor that may compromise competitiveness.
We use total environmental expenses as endogenous variable rather than pollution levels of a specific type of pollutant. Most importantly, we look at export activity as determining factor since the relationship between international competitiveness and environmental control is at heart of our analysis. However, since informal regulation may also exert influence on the level of environmental spending, we control for local socio-economic characteristics in a way very similar to Pargal and Wheeler.
Empirical Model and Data
We seek to analyze the nature of the relationship between environmental expenditures and international competitiveness. To this end we want to establish whether export-oriented firms tend to have lower or higher environmental expenditures and whether this pattern is different for foreign-owned firms as compared to domestically owned firms. Thus we include ownership and export orientation in our regression and control for other relevant establishment-specific, sectoral, and regional characteristics. We account also for the presence of regional effects of informal regulation along the lines of Pargal and Wheeler (1996) . 16 For those establishments that are only "discovered" after being in operation for a number of years, BPS creates a supplementary "backcast" dataset with a limited number a variables to achieve better estimates of the total LME manufacturing population output, value added, and employment, cf. Hill, Hall and Kai-Alexander Kaiser.
2001. "Indonesian's Industrial Transformation, Revisited.". 17 The regression equation for the outcome stage is then
where y i is the observed level of environmental expenditures for establishment i, x i is the vector of exogenous parameters, z is a dichotomous realization of a latent variable z* which takes on the value 1 if a positive environmental spending is observable (i.e., iff z*>0) and zero otherwise and β is the vector of regression parameters. i λˆ is the estimate of the inverse Mill's ratio, θ is the covariance ( The control variables are intended to capture all other effects on environmental expenses. We assume that plants with high pollution levels are more likely to engage in environmental protection and/or tend to spend more. Thus we use the following proxies for pollution emission:
Of course the level of pollution is sector-specific. For both regressions we use sectoral dummies as exogenous variables on the two digit SITC levels.
Size: Larger firms will tend to be more polluting, other things being equal. We thus expect a higher likelihood to incur environmental expenditures and, if so, a higher level. There may be economies of scale in environmental protection or abatement activities leading to lower environmental expenditures per unit of output. We therefore control for size by using the natural logarithm of output [LN(OUTPUT)] as explanatory variable.
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Energy intensity: Energy intensive plants tend to be more polluting and therefore should have a higher probability to report environmental expenditures and should tend to report higher 18 One could argue that output may in turn be a function of environmental expenditures as high environmental expenditures may tend to reduce competitiveness and thus output thereby leading to a simultaneity problem. Although this might be a potential problem it would not be as severe as in other regressions of this kind: Because environmental expenditures are voluntary, we can expect firms to determine their optimal output and decide independently on their optimal environmental expenditures rather than being forced to determine their output under the constraint of environmental regulations.
environmental expenditures. We constructed energy intensity as the share of fuel costs in total output.
Age: This variable proxies the plant's level of technology -older firms should tend to have higher pollution intensities and therefore higher end-of-pipe expenditures. Note that the environmental expenditures used as endogenous variable in this study do not include investment expenditures. Therefore cleaner but also more expensive technology would reduce environmental expenditures.
Furthermore we have included year dummies to capture any time specific effects such as business cycle effects. In one set of regressions we included 13 regional dummies to capture any possible effects of 'informal regulations' as studied by Pargal and Wheeler (1996) and other region-specific effects. In a different set of regressions we addressed the 'informal regulations' more directly the way Pargal and Wheeler did by including socioeconomic characteristics of the districts that are conjectured to proxy the pressure which the local population exerts on polluting plants. They are share of urban population, share of population with secondary education, and per capita expenditure, all at the district level (kabupaten/kota). Table 3 reports location characteristics which will be used to proxy for possible informal regulation as per Pargal and Wheeler (1996) through pressures of affected citizens at the local level (see above). We use a local indicator of prosperity/income (per capita household expenditures), education (share of the total population with secondary education), and share of urbanization as defined at the level of the more than three hundred local administrative areas (kabupaten and kota). These are drawn from the National Socio-Economic Household Survey (SUSENAS) annual cores, which provide statistical significance to that level. 
Results
We pooled our three years of data on environmental expenditures. Using a larger sample tends to wash out business cycle effects and enhances reliability of results; at the same time a three year period is too short to run a meaningful panel regression. 20 We have excluded 1997
because of the disruptions caused by the Asian crisis and missing data problems on exports.
Results are presented below. Table 4 presents the results of the outcome and selection stages of our estimates with ENVSPENDER and ENVEXPENDITURES as endogenous variables. We suppress the sectoral and year dummies. Regression model (1) looks at firm-specific characteristics only and disregards local factor such as a possible informal regulation.
The most striking result is that establishments that engage in export activities -i.e., the selection stage of our regression ---are significantly more likely to report environmental expenses. However, at the outcome stage of those who do report, environmental expenditures are lower in terms of Rupiah levels, naturally controlling for size and other plant level chateracteristics.
There are two lines of reasoning for this observation. Since exporting establishments are more likely to incur environmental expenditures, also those establishments report at least some expenses that would not do so if they were domestically oriented, thus leading to a lower average expenditure for the exporting plants. In other words, lower environmental expenses for exporting plants are due to a different selection bias and not to lower environmental expenses for otherwise comparable establishments. 20 Pooling gives newly established firms and those which went out of business less weight than the other firms which enter twice or three times. We do not consider that as a problem as newly established firms may not yet have found their optimal level of environmental expenditures and firms that go out of business may not have optimal expenditures anyways. Since environmental expenditures are voluntary, they cannot be responsible for the bankruptcy either, therefore a discrimination against such firms does not blur a causal link. Alternatively we would have to pick a specific year at random. Still, we have run all regressions separately for each year which did not alter the results significantly. Alternatively, it is conceivable that exporting firms engage in some sort of environmental protection activity in order to satisfy consumers in export markets, but that the exposure to international competition leads them to reduce these expenditures However, if environmental costs indeed would reduce competitiveness in any significant manner, the variable EXPORTER should have turned out significantly negative also in the selection stage since environmental expenditures are basically voluntary. Our result contradicts this notion.
Foreign-owned firms are not significantly more likely to report environmental expenditures but if they do their environmental expenditures are significantly higher than for the other firms. This positive differential effect is much stronger than the negative effect for exporter indicating that ownership matters much more than export orientation. These observations lend support for our technology-hypothesis advanced earlier. It also implies that differences in environmental standards may not be an appropriate instrument to attract foreign direct investment.
Control variables are also highly significant and have the expected signs: Larger firms tend to report more often positive environmental expenses as do more energy intensive plants.
Interestingly, older firms are more likely to engage in environmental protection, but tend to spend less, possibly because they can achieve a higher improvement at a lower/minimal investment). The first component accounts already for almost two thirds of the variance in the three variables, so that we included it as additional regressor representing the influence of informal regulation on the decision to incur environmental costs. Results are reported in regression model (2) in Table 4 . In our large sample including more than 60 thousand observations it turns out that informal regulation has no effect on the level of environmental expenditures and makes it even less likely that plants invest in environmental expenditures at all. All other results are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the decision of Indonesian manufacturing firms to engage in reported environmental abatement expenditures. We find that exporting firms are significantly more likely to incur environmental expenses (and spend no less) after controlling for relevant plant level characteristics. This finding contradicts the notion that firms exposed to international competition will be less likely to engage in environmental abatement expenditures relatively to domestically oriented firms.
As a second major result, we find that foreign owned firms spend significantly more on environmental protection activities than domestically owned firms, once we have controlled for those actually reporting. Although foreign firms may already be using "cleaner" home country technology thereby mainstreaming part of their environmental expenditures, competitive pressure does not appear to limit their environmental expenditures relative to other firms. We find no evidence that lenient or non-existing environmental regulations establish an effective incentive to attract foreign capital.
Our ability to disentangle why foreign oriented firms do not appear to limit environmental expenditures relative to other firms is still somewhat limited. This finding may be due to reputation effects as much as Green Consumerism in exports markets, or to a different technology. The resolve this uncertainty it would be very insightful to differentiate exporting firms according to their export markets. In some case, FDI if finalized to production for international markets has to be standard-proof anyway. Our current data set does not permit a differentiation according to export markets. However, we may be able to extend our analysis to differentiate by countries ("green" or "brown" owners) of the source of foreign investment.
International best practice is increasingly moving to mainstreaming environmental abatement.
This for example has been the approach of German Technical Assistance (GTZ) in Indonesia in this area. They argue that greener production is incidental to cost-gains of more efficient production processes, and it is this incentive that is mainly used to promote the improved environmental performance of establishments in Indonesia. This approach conforms to our findings that firms may mainly engage in environmental expenditures because they are part of efficient production processes, rather than additional costs. As our results show, however, the mainstreaming of environmental abatement may also make it less likely that firms actual would report expenditures. The SI has stopped collecting data on environmental expenditures in the context of streamlining the survey in the context of the Asian economic crisis. Although we currently do not have necessary data, future research may wish to look in more detail into the relationship between reporting and actual mainstreaming/outcomes for pollution abatement.
Our paper suggests that the voluntary approach of "eco-grading" of plants (i.e., PROPER etc.) leverages our demand channel (i.e., green consumerism) in a context where the capacity for formal regulation and monitoring remains limited. Of course, improved regulations and enforcement can bring about improved environmental quality. Done well, and in the context of mainstreamed abatement, we argue that these regulations do not necessarily erode competitiveness.
However, a major problem in Indonesia remains corruption and bureaucratic efficiency. As a further line of research it would be interesting to examine how corruption and environmental expenditures interact with each other and whether and to what extent informal payments may substitute for environmental expenditures. This again suggests that the most effective forms of pollution abatement may not be through bureaucratic enforcement (which may be abused), but through our channels that encourage "voluntary" good practice.
